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4.1 Introduction
Steadily worsening inflation has brought renewed interest in the gold
standard as a way to stabilize the purchasing power of the dollar. Only a
few economists openly advocate the return to the gold standard; most
regard it as a dangerous anachronism. My purpose in this paper is to
explore the good and bad features of the gold standard and its generaliza-
tion, the commodity standard, without taking a stand for or against the
idea. A properly managed commodity standard emerges as a potential
competitor to a properly managed fiat money system as a way to achieve
price stability. Both systems require good management. Simply switching
from our existing badly managed fiat money to a badly managed com-
modity standard might well be a step backward.
The basic findings of the paper are:
1. During the years of the gold standard in the United States (1879-
1914), inflation was kept to reasonable levels but cumulated over decades
so that the long-run purchasing power of the dollar declined by 40%. The
gold standard does not meet the requirement of long-run stabilization of
the real value of the dollar. Moreover, recent instability in the world gold
market would have brought alternating periods of severe inflation and
deflation had the United States been on the gold standard.
2. An acceptable commodity standard could be based on a package of
several commodities, chosen so that the historical association of the price
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of the package and the cost of living has been close. An example of such a
package contains ammonium nitrate, copper, aluminum, and plywood.
3. Even with the best choice of a commodity standard, it is necessary
to redefine the standard periodically. Monthly changes in the commodity
content of the dollar should be used according to a fixed rule. Such a rule
can promise almost exact long-run stability in the cost of living.
4. Whatever type of commodity standard is adopted, the government
should not hold reserves of the commodity. Manipulation of reserves and
intervention in commodity markets defeat the anti-inflationary purpose
of the commodity standard.
5. Though a good commodity standard would have been far superior
to the actual monetary policy of the past two decades, better manage-
ment of the existing system based on flat money might have done as well
or better. The commodity standard is not inherently superior to fiat
money as a way to stabilize the cost of living. The commodity standard is
just as subject to abuse as is the existing system.
4.2 The Nature of a Commodity Standard
Under a commodity standard, the government would establish a pre-
cise definition of the dollar as a particular quantity of a commodity or
quantities of several commodities. For many years in the United States,
the dollar was simply 0.04838 of an ounce of gold, for example. As I will
argue later in this paper, it is probably better to define the dollar in terms
of a resource unit containing a number of commodities rather than in
terms of a single commodity like gold. The resource unit itself would be
legal tender and would replace dollar bills and the accounting entries
currently serving as legal tender in this country. Of course, the physical
resources would not actually circulate as currency. Banks and other
services would be free to offer accounts denominated in dollars. The
Federal Reserve would no longer maintain reserve accounts; reserve
requirements and the whole apparatus limiting bank deposits would be
abandoned.
The commodity standard stabilizes prices by providing a definition of
the dollar in terms of real economic quantities. In this respect it differs
sharply from the current system where the dollar is defined as a piece of
paper whose value comes only from a scarcity created by the government.
Advocates of commodity standards believe that establishment of the
standard will prevent the government from continuing the kind of infla-
tion we have had over the past twenty years. However, a commodity
standard has within it a policy instrument whose effects on the economy,
inflationary and otherwise, are very similar to the effects of the money
stock under today's system: The government can redefine the commodity
content of the dollar at any time. The dollar price of the resource unit is113 Explorations in the Gold Standard
closely analogous under a commodity standard to the monetary base
under a fiat money system. The government can create inflation under a
commodity standard by raising the dollar price of the resource unit just as
it has created inflation by raising the number of dollars in the monetary
base. Furthermore, there are very good reasons why the government
should have the power to change the dollar price of the resource unit, just
as there are very good reasons for the government to change the mone-
tary base under the current system. There is no substitute for good
management in order to achieve satisfactory price stability.
Both a commodity standard and conventional fiat money rest on the
legal tender power of the government. Under the power, the government
provides the courts with a precise legal definition of what action is
required to discharge a dollar debt. In the present system, the currency
issued by the Federal Reserve is legal tender. Delivery of currency legally
discharges a debt, though in practice most debts are discharged by
payment in reserves (through a check on a commercial bank), not cur-
rency. The policies of the Federal Reserve keep currency and reserves
trading at exact par, except occasionally for small coins, which may sell at
a premium. Because legal tender is just an arbitrary paper liability of the
Fed, the legal tender definition of the monetary unit makes no promise
about the purchasing power of tjie dollar. People writing contracts involv-
ing future payments in dollars take their chances on the government's
success in ensuring the future meaning of the dollar. Though the needs of
the courts are perfectly well met by the current system, the public suffers
because of the instability of the real value of the dollar. Even so, a great
many contracts—bonds, mortgages, annuities, installment borrowing,
and even some forward purchases of goods and services—continue to be
written in terms of the United States dollar. And in nations whose
monetary units are even less stable than the dollar, future obligations are
frequently stated in terms of the dollar.
4.3 The Gold Standard
The definition of legal tender exclusively in terms of a paper liability of
the United States government dates from the creation of the Federal
Reserve in 1914. Before then, legal tender was gold or its equivalent in
gold-backed certificates of the federal government. In effect, the dollar
was defined as 0.04838 of an ounce of gold. If there arose a question about
the settlement of a debt, the courts could ask if the appropriate amount of
gold or an asset of the same value had been offered.
Though the United States government continued to issue a paper
currency during the era of the gold standard (1879-1914) and to limit the
rights of private banks to issue currency, the substantive effect of the
policy came from the legal definition of the dollar, not from the govern-114 Robert E. Hall
ment's control of the money stock. Essentially the same control of prices
could have been achieved just from the definition of legal tender, without
any control of the private creation of money. In any case, there was no
serious attempt to control the deposits of banks, which were a growing
fraction of the money supply.
The gold standard dramatically limited inflation relative to what hap-
pened during the Civil War or the 1970s, but did not completely stabilize
the price level by any means. Over the period from 1880 to 1910, annual
rates of inflation measured over five-year intervals varied from —1.3%
per year from 1890 to 1895 to 2.1% per year from 1905 to 1910. There was
continual mild inflation around 2% per year from 1895 to 1910 because of
shifts in the world supply of gold. Though annual rates of inflation never
reached troublesome levels, the compounding of inflation year after year
meant the gold standard was quite ineffective in stabilizing the long-run
purchasing power of the dollar. Between 1895 and 1912, the cost of living
rose 40%. Forward economic arrangements made in 1895 were seriously
dislocated by the surprising decline in the real value of the dollar over the
ensuing two decades.
Recent turbulence in gold markets casts even more serious doubt on
the wisdom of a dollar defined in terms of a fixed quantity of gold.
Between 1968 and 1970, the purchasing power of an ounce of gold fell by
18%. Then its purchasing power rose by 350% to a peak in 1974, declined
by 32% over the next two years, and then rose by 600% to another peak
in 1980. Had the United States been on the gold standard over this
period, there would have been considerable inflationary pressure in
1968-70, 1974-76, and 1981, and crushing deflation in 1970-74 and
1976-80. Because a United States gold standard might have stabilized the
gold market over this period had we been on the gold standard, it is not
accurate to say that the changes in the United States price level would
have been as large as the actual changes in the purchasing power of gold,
but large changes in the price level would certainly have occurred. The
fixed gold standard is not the answer for price stability.
4.4 Defining the Dollar in Terms of a Resource Unit
The gold standard is one instance of a more general technique for
defining the dollar. Any commodity can take the place of gold, as long
as the replacement is sufficiently homogeneous and easily measured.
Further, the dollar can be defined in terms of a composite of several
commodities. There was a serious proposal in the nineteenth century to
define the dollar as half gold and half silver, which would have avoided
some of the fluctuations of prices under the pure gold standard.
As a general matter, the dollar could be defined in terms of a resource
unit containing a number of standardized commodities. Primary indus-
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instability of the gold standard, it is desirable to choose a resource unit
whose value has moved closely with the cost of living historically. Then
pegging its value by defining the dollar in terms of the resource unit will
come close to stabilizing the cost of living.
After studying the relation between the cost of living and the prices of a
long list of suitable commodities, I have selected a resource unit contain-
ing just four of them to serve as an example of a possible definition of the
dollar. The long list contained wheat, sugar, heating oil, soybean oil,
plywood, copper, tin, zinc, nylon, cotton, ammonium nitrate, latex,
mercury, and aluminum. The four commodities whose combined price
has moved closely with the cost of living are aluminum, copper, plywood,
and ammonium nitrate. A resource unit that I will call the ANCAP compris-
ing 33 cents worth of ammonium nitrate, 12 cents worth of copper, 36
cents worth of aluminum, and 19 cents worth of plywood (all in 1967
prices) had a market price very close to the cost of living throughout the
postwar era. Its worst instabilities occurred in 1955, when the price of the
resource unit rose by nine percentage points more than the cost of living,
and in 1974, when the price of the unit rose by ten percentage points
more. In 1970, the price of the unit fell relative to the cost of living by
almost 9%. In other years, changes in the price of the resource unit have
been closer to the changes in the cost of living. In particular, the gyrations
of the United States and world economies in 1979 and 1980, with atten-
dant high rates of inflation, brought about no important shifts in the price
of the resource unit relative to the cost of living. In other words, had we
defined the dollar as the resource unit, the cost of living would have been
steady within two or three percentage points instead of rising by 11 and
13% in those two years.
4.5 Achieving Price Stability under a Commodity Standard
A fixed commodity standard will bring about fluctuations in the cost of
living as the supply and demand for the resource unit ebbs and flows.
Whenever the costs of producing the unit decline relative to the cost of
living, the cost of living will rise and the public will complain about
inflation. Exactly this happened in the first decade of the twentieth
century. Under a fixed commodity standard, inflation is not a monetary
phenomenon but a real one—it reflects the changing real circumstances
of the economy.
A simple answer to the instability of prices under a commodity stan-
dard was offered by Irving Fisher in 1920 in his book Stabilizing the
Dollar. The answer is just as good today as sixty years ago. What is
needed is gradual adjustments in the definition of the dollar so that its
purchasing power remains constant as time passes. When the commod-
ities in the resource unit are in plentiful supply and inflation is conse-
quently a problem, the number of resource units in the dollar needs to be116 Robert E. Hall
raised. To put it the other way around, the dollar price of a resource unit
needs to be lowered to offset inflation as it occurs. Similarly, when the
price level drops below target, the dollar price of the resource unit should
be raised.
Readjustments in the dollar price of the resource unit could be the
responsibility of the Federal Reserve Board just as the quantity of money
is under the board's discretion in the present system. Much the same
considerations would underlie the setting of the dollar price as permeate
monetary policy today. A higher dollar price of the resource unit stim-
ulates the economy in the short run and brings a higher cost of living in the
longer run, just as monetary expansion does in the current system.
Probably the major obstacle to ending inflation over the past decade has
been the concern about the deep recession that is feared as a consequence
of sharply lower money growth rates. Under a commodity standard,
exactly the same concern would limit anti-inflation policy. There would
be strong pressure for continual increases in the dollar price of the
resource unit in order to keep up with the inflationary momentum built
into the economy today. It is no more realistic to expect that the dollar
price of the resource unit could be held constant under a commodity
standard than it is to expect an immediate move to zero growth of the
money stock under the present system.
Because discretionary monetary policy gave us the current high rates of
inflation and has made almost no progress in reducing money growth so
as to lower inflation, it is tempting to eliminate discretion and install a
simple policy rule that would guarantee price stability. Within the com-
modity standard, a simple rule proposed by Irving Fisher seems very
suitable: Every month, change the dollar value of the resource unit by a
formula. The formula prescribes a 1% decrease in the dollar price for
each percent by which the most recent cost of living index exceeds the
target level. If the cost of living is below target, raise the dollar price by
the same rule.
In the United States, the cost of living is measured by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), which is simply the market price of a rather extensive
basket of goods and services. In effect, Fisher's formula defines the dollar
as enough resource units to buy the CPI basket at its most recently
measured price.
Adaptive redefinition of the dollar through the formula would lead
ultimately to a price level very close to the target embedded in the
formula. The duration of the adjustment process depends on the flexibil-
ity of the prices of the consumer goods in the CPI. Every redefinition of
the dollar would bring immediate parallel responses of highly flexible
prices in formal and informal auction markets. How soon the changes are
transmitted to markets for finished goods and for labor is a matter of
controversy among economists. If something like a Phillips curve governs
wages and some prices, then the redefinition of the dollar brings unem-117 Explorations in the Gold Standard
ployment or boom. When some accident pushes the cost of living above
the target, the formula calls for a lower dollar price of the resource unit.
Sellers who do not adjust their dollar prices downward will be asking for
more resources in return for what they are selling. There will be an excess
supply of goods in all markets where prices do not fall immediately. On
the other hand, there will be excess demand in the market for resource
units, where the dollar price of output has declined, unless the dollar
costs of inputs including labor also decline. Thus the redefinition of the
dollar puts downward pressure on wages and prices throughout the
economy. The only upward pressure is on the dollar price of the resource
unit, which is fixed by the government's legal tender decree.
If wages and prices do not yield right away to the stabilizing pressure
from the redefinition of the dollar, output and employment will fall. Sales
of goods and services other than resource units will be constrained by
inadequate demand because of their excessive prices. Output of resource
units will be limited by supply, because the price has been depressed
without an immediate compensating reduction in costs. In the aggregate,
output and employment will fall. As prices and wages yield to the pres-
sure of excess supply, full employment will be restored as the cost of
living drops back to the target.
The Fisher formula is applied each month, and so intensifies pressure
on prices and wages as time passes unless the cost of living returns to its
target level. If many successive downward shifts in the dollar price of the
resource unit are needed to coax the cost of living back to its target level
after a disturbance, the real costs of the disturbance are correspondingly
higher.
Aggressive redefinition of the dollar value of the resource unit is
virtually a necessity in an economy with sticky prices and wages. Under a
fixed commodity standard, all shifts in the purchasing power of the
resource unit have to be accommodated by changes in the price level.
When the resource unit becomes scarcer, the cost of living must fall. If
this requires a prolonged period of excess supply, output and employ-
ment may be below potential for an excessively long time. With an
adjustable commodity standard, the real consequences are much less
severe. As soon as excess supply begins to drive the cost of living below
the target, relief is obtained in the form of an upward movement in the
dollar price of the resource unit. Monthly redefinitions continue until the
new equilibrium is achieved at the target cost of living and a higher dollar
price of the resource unit. The cumulative lost output and employment is
far less than under the fixed commodity standard.
4.6 An Example of the Adjustable Commodity Standard
To give a fuller explanation of how an adjustable standard would work,
I will give an extended example. The reader should understand that this is118 Robert E. Hall
an example, not a detailed proposal. It is still very much an open question
whether a commodity standard can be made to perform as well as a
conventional monetary system or, if it can, what characteristics it should
have.
The first step in creating a workable commodity currency is to issue a
detailed physical definition of the resource unit. Under a gold standard
this is simply a matter of stating the amount and purity of the gold. For the
four-commodity resource unit mentioned earlier in this paper, the ANCAP,
much more needs to be said, and probably the Bureau of Standards
would be the appropriate agency to provide the exact specifications of the
resource unit. For the two metals in the unit, copper and aluminum,
weight and purity are again the important characteristics. For plywood,
the type of wood, the thickness, the type of adhesive, and the quality of
the two outside surfaces have to be specified. For ammonium nitrate, the
purity, the permissible levels of contaminants, and the moisture content
are important. For all four commodities, quality specifications in great
detail are made routinely in commercial contracts for delivery of the
commodities, and these specifications would provide a guide for defining
the resource unit in adequate detail for the courts.
In addition to the physical characteristics of the resource unit, it is
important to prescribe the location. Gold is so valuable that its transport
costs are negligible and it is unnecessary to specify where it is located
when it is delivered to make a payment. For most other commodities,
physical delivery to the creditor is undesirable and impractical. Instead,
as in organized commodities markets today, a standard delivery point
should be established for each commodity. Again, existing practices
provide a guide for the definition of the resource unit.
The next step is to set the dollar price of the resource unit. Market
enforcement of the price will be precise and immediate; it is impossible
for the sum of the market prices of the amounts of the commodities in the
resource unit to depart significantly from the announced dollar price of
the unit. The reason is simple. If the sum of the prices exceeded the set
price, then sellers would receive more than one resource unit in value
every time they sold a unit. Remember that when sellers post a dollar
price, they have the right to receive payment in resource units instead of
any other form of payment. Sellers could make unlimited profits by
selling and reselling, each time coming out ahead in resource units.
Naturally, as they attempted to do so, they would bid down the prices of
the commodities to the point where their sum was equal to the govern-
ment's set price. Buyers would do exactly the same thing if the sum of the
prices of the commodities fell short of the set price. Whenever the sum of
the prices departed from the set price by more than transactions costs, an
opportunity for covered arbitrage would become available, and experi-
ence in countless markets teaches that experts quickly eliminate all
opportunities for covered arbitrage.119 Explorations in the Gold Standard
The dollar price of the resource unit could be set by the discretion of a
government agency, just as the Federal Reserve Board sets the quantity
of money today. But discretionary policy is exactly what has given us high
rates of inflation for the past two decades, so the move to a commodity
standard for the dollar should also involve a move to a fixed policy rule
that guarantees the eventual return to a stable dollar. Something like
Irving Fisher's rule is appropriate, though his proposal of monthly adjust-
ments by the full amount of the error in the price level is probably much
too aggressive. Instead, monthly adjustments one-twelfth as large seem
to be about right. Accordingly, an example of a formula is: Each month,
depress the dollar price of the resource unit by one-twelfth of the amount
by which the most recent CPI exceeds the target level. Over the course of
a year in which the CPI is consistently 1% too high, the dollar price will be
lowered by a full percent. In other words, apply Fisher's formula monthly
at annual rates. The monthly adjustment would rarely exceed a few
tenths of a percent.
The final step in putting the economy onto the adjustable ANCAP
standard is to decide on the appropriate target path for prices. The
standard will keep the cost of living quite close to the path, so it is much
more than the wishful thinking of previous government announcements
of disinflation targets. Still, the conflict between gradualism and cold
turkey policies is just as acute under a commodity standard as under the
current monetary approach to price stabilization. Under gradualism, the
target price path would eliminate inflation at one or two percentage
points per year. In order to limit the adverse effects of disinflation on
employment and output, the momentum of inflation is slowed gradually
over a period of five to ten years. As public confidence grows in the
success of the new approach to price stabilization, the decline in the
target inflation rate could be made more aggressive. Sensible specific
targets for the CPI are given in table 4.1 Again the target is not just
wishful thinking. The dollar price of the resource unit is to be pushed as
far as necessary to get the cost of living close to the target.
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How well would the economy function under the ANCAP standard? At
first, the public would react with a healthy skepticism bred by numerous
unsuccessful anti-inflationary policies of the past two decades. During
this period, depressed employment and output would be a possibility, as
the policy struggled against the public's instinct to continue raising wages
and prices. As the public became convinced that the price targets were
going to be met, the depressive effects would disappear. Whether the
process would take six months or three years we do not know. In any
case, by the middle of the decade the system would be close to its steady
state. From then on, long-term stability of the cost of living would be
guaranteed by the commodity standard. Short-run instabilities would
remain. In years of plentiful commodity supply, the cost of living would
rise a little, which would set in motion the automatic redefinition of the
dollar to restore its purchasing power. The economy would experience a
few months of mild inflation, followed by a few months of deflation as the
redefinition took effect. At the same time, a boom in real activity would
occur, possibly followed by a recession.
Periods of worldwide increases in commodity prices, as in 1973-74,
would have the opposite effect, triggering a deflation and recession under
the commodity standard. Subsequently, the dollar would be redefined to
contain fewer resource units, the cost of living would begin to rise, and
real activity would recover. However, it is an inherent feature of com-
modity standards that sharp changes in world commodity markets create
fluctuations in an economy relying on the standard.
How would the ANCAP standard change daily economic life? Plainly, its
most important effect would be the restoration of long-run stability in the
purchasing power of the dollar. The many long-run dollar commitments
made by the typical citizen—pensions, mortgages, employment agree-
ments, bonds, and the like—would function again in the way they were
originally intended to. To the nonspecialist, the change in the definition
of the dollar would not have any other visible manifestations. Daily
business would continue to be conducted in familiar ways; the option to
take payment in commodities would never be exercised by anyone but an
arbitrage specialist. The typical American would be no more aware of the
system that enforced the definition of the dollar than is the tourist today
who changes money in a foreign country is aware of the apparatus of the
foreign-exchange market.
4.7 The Government Should Not Hold Commodity Reserves
under a Commodity Standard
Under a commodity standard, the government will be tempted to
intervene in markets for the commodities used to define the dollar. When
some upward pressure on costs occurs, the government will be under121 Explorations in the Gold Standard
pressure to validate them by selling commodities rather than by letting
the system push costs back down. In short, commodity sales from a
reserve let the government deliberately create inflation, contrary to the
intent of the commodity standard.
The postwar history of the United States illustrates this point very well.
United States policy continued to peg the dollar price of gold at $35 per
ounce for several years after inflation got started. Not until the spring of
1968 was official intervention in the gold market halted. Stabilization of
the price of gold was possible in the face of rising prices of almost
everything else only because the government had accumulated an enor-
mous gold reserve. Selling out of the reserve and so pegging the dollar
price of gold did nothing to limit inflation.
Not only does intervention in commodity markets blunt the price-
stabilizing power of the commodity standard, but it introduces an un-
acceptable instability of its own. If the government is committed to a
policy of intervention, it constantly faces the danger of running out of
reserves. History has shown repeatedly that governments do not react to
exhaustion of reserves by letting the commodity standard work by itself
after intervention becomes impossible. Instead, they protect reserves by
raising the money price of the commodity, again an inflationary move.
For two reasons—the inflationary potential of government commodity
sales and the likelihood of redefinitions of money to protect reserves—it
is centrally important to prohibit government intervention in commodity
markets. The role of the government should be limited to defining the
dollar in terms of commodities, not trying to influence the relative price
of commodities. That relative price should be set by private markets.
4.8 A Commodity Standard Is Not Clearly Superior to a
Well-managed Fiat Money System
The preceding discussion suggests that we would have been much
better off under the ANCAP standard starting in 1965 than we were under
the blundering monetary policy we actually had. But blunders are just as
possible under a commodity standard. The dollar price of the resource
unit is a policy instrument similar in many respects to the money stock in
our current system. It would have been tempting to raise the dollar price
for the same reasons and under the same circumstances as we actually
raised the money stock. Holding the line on the dollar price would have
been excoriated as excessively restrictive policy just as holding the line on
money would have been in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Under proper management, a fiat money system could promise long-
run price stability through exactly the same kind of adaptive policy as
Irving Fisher proposed for the commodity standard. If the Federal Re-
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target and raised it whenever the cost of living was too low, using the
same rule—one-twelfth of a percent less money each month for each
percent of excessively high prices—stability of the cost of living would be
assured. Compared to a commodity standard, such a system would
insulate the economy more effectively from commodity shocks, but at the
cost of making it vulnerable to shifts in the demand for money. We do not
know at this stage which type of shock is more destabilizing.
4.9 Conclusions
The gold standard is unacceptable as a basis for stabilizing the dollar
because variations in the relation between the world price of gold and the
United States cost of living are much too large. Under a gold standard,
every drop in the demand for gold would bring sharp inflation. Even
Irving Fisher's monthly redefinition of the gold content of the dollar
could not keep up with the world gold market. A commodity standard
based on more prosaic commodities whose prices have moved closely
with the cost of living—for example, the ANCAP bundle mentioned in this
paper—would do a good job of stabilizing the purchasing power of the
dollar. Fisher's systematic redefinition is important to offset long-run
changes in the relative price of the resource unit and the cost of living. A
well-designed commodity standard would be a good way, but not the only
way, to restore stability to the dollar.
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